*Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. The law school where I am honored and privileged to teach provided a research grant in order for me to write this Article. I am very grateful to Professor Michael D. Sousa of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, who served as my editor for this Article and showed me tremendous patience and courtesy while doing so. Any errors are solely my responsibility. Finally, I am grateful to every author whose work I cited. All of you have made valuable contributions to the subject of balancing an employer's prerogative to hire or refuse to hire a person on any terms that it sees fit with the employee's right to work or attempt to work in an environment that is free of irrational discrimination. I hope this Article does likewise. irrational discrimination. It is irrational to deny employment to a person who is or was a debtor if the person is otherwise qualified, and the job can be successfully performed regardless of bankruptcy status. To allow such discrimination makes the bankruptcy system's promise of a fresh start illusory.
INTRODUCTION.
One of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to give those who seek its protections a "fresh start" from the financial problems that caused them to file bankruptcy in the first place.' In order to effectuate the fresh start principle of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 525 on November 6, 1978.2 Section 525 prohibits government employers from denying employment to, terminating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment against a person who is or has been a debtor, or who is or has been associated with a debtor.
3 On July 10, 1984, Congress extended this non-discrimination principle to private employers by enacting 11 U.S.C. § 525(b), which prohibits private employers from terminating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment against a person who is or has been a debtor, or who is or has been associated with a debtor.4
Under § 525, government employers are expressly prohibited from "denying employment to" persons who have filed bankruptcy or who are currently in a bankruptcy proceeding,5 but private employers are not. 6 Despite the absence of an express prohibition on private employers refusing to hire a debtor, an issue has arisen in the courts on the question of whether private employers, like their government counterparts, are prohibited from "denying employment to" a person because that person is or has been in bankruptcy, and every court that has addressed the question except one has held that § 525(b) does not prohibit private employers from refusing to hire a person 'Perez v. Campbell commentators on the question of whether an applicant's credit history is a fair predictor of whether the applicant might steal from his or her employer, or whether the applicant is mature, responsible, trustworthy, honest, reliable, has integrity, has good judgment, and is capable of handling the pressures of a job.' 0 The majority view among the commentariat is that credit history checks are unreliable proxies for the kind of characteristics that employers seek in job applicants." There are, however, commentators who reach the opposite conclusion.' 2 A credit check will disclose a bankruptcy, and on average, black and Latino'
3 Americans have lower credit scores than white Americans' 4 partly employers conducted credit checks in order to reduce the likelihood of theft, embezzlement, and other criminal activity; 27% did in order to manage legal liability for negligent hiring; 12% did in order to assess the overall trustworthiness of the applicant; 7% did in order to comply with applicable state laws that mandate background checks); Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *5-6; Shepard, supra note 8, at 1002-11. 'oConcepci6n, supra note 8, at 537-41 (there is little to no relationship between credit history and job performance); Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 163-72 (there is a lack of demonstrable evidence connecting credit reports to predicting an applicant's criminal behavior or job performance); Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *3-6 ("There is a complete absence of evidence that employee credit checks are job-related at all, much less consistent with business necessity, for any job -and there is substantial evidence that the credit records that employers check are based on factors substantially unrelated to any aspect of the performance of any job. To our knowledge, credit checks as a basis for employment decisions is a practice validated by no studies, much less by studies meeting the strict standard of proof justifying a job requirement imposing a disparate impact.") (emphasis in original); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1711-22 (2012) (noting that there is little empirical support for the proposition that employees or applicants for employment who have financial problems are more prone to commit theft, fraud, or accept bribes). But see Robert J. Landry & Benjamin Hardy, Bankrupts Need Not Apply: Sound Hiring Policy or Dangerous Proposition?, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 47, 57-60 (2012) ("A past bankruptcy may serve as a proxy for responsibility, honesty, judgment, and good management skills, particularly when it comes to handling money or property." The authors also said that "drawing these kinds of conclusions about individuals based solely on bankruptcy status is stereotyping that may or may not be true in a given situation."); James D. 
(2015) ("A
study indicates that financial stress can impact work performance. While not an overwhelming number of studies validate the work performance -good credit link, there are at least some good quality and fairly recently reported studies [that] validate the use of credit reports for screening applicants.").
"Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 537-41; Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 163-72; Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *3-6; Shepard, supra note 10, at 1711-22. 1 2 Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 57-60; Phillips & Schein, supra note 10, at 153-55.
because black families are more than three times as likely to file bankruptcy as white families, and Latino families are almost twice as likely to file bankruptcy as white families.'5 Black and Latino persons are overrepresented among bankruptcy filers, which means black and Latino persons are probably disproportionately impacted by employers' use of credit checks as a pre-employment screening device.16 Some believe that the primary reason people file bankruptcy is because of profligate spending.' 7 It is true that financial recklessness leads some to the doorsteps of the bankruptcy courthouse, but it is untrue that the majority of persons who file bankruptcy do so because they refused to cut up the credit card. 8 Job losses, medical problems, and divorce account for 85% to 90% of bankruptcy filings,'9 and in 2012, the "median average monthly income" of the 1.1 million persons who filed for personal bankruptcy was $2,743, while their "median average monthly expenses" were $2,769, a mere $26 difference.20
Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 186-87; Karpa, supra note 8, at 84, 88-89 (on average, whites have a 21% higher credit score than blacks); Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *2 (blacks have bad credit records at a 21% higher rate than whites); Shepard, supra note 10, at 1042. "'Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 526, 529-41; Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 161-72; Karpa, supra note 8, at 86-90; Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *1-6; Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 54-56; Shepard, supra note 10, at 1010-13, 1041-44. But see Phillips & Schein, supra note 10, at 156 ("While often alleged by opponents of the use of credit reports, the anecdotal evidence suggests that minorities are not necessarily disadvantaged by the use of credit reports.").
"Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 167; Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Economics, Law, and Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485, 1492-1503 (2004) .
"Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 167 ('People spend 21% less on clothing than they did in the early 1970's, and families today often conserve financial resources by shopping at low-cost, highvolume retailers such as Wal-Mart. The cost of appliances has dropped, but necessary expenses like mortgages, health insurance, transportation, and child care have increased dramatically. Families typically spend around 75% of their income on essential goods, leaving little room in the budget for luxury purchases."); Warren, supra note 17, at 1492-1503. 27 In each of these cases, the employer did not "look beneath" the applicant's bankruptcy filing to determine if the person actually lacked any of the personal character traits the employer wanted in an employee. 28 Instead, the employers used bankruptcy status simpliciter as the reason to deny the person a job.
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Personal creditworthiness can probably be linked to the successful performance of jobs that require financial expertise like hedge fund managers, investment portfolio managers, chief financial officers, stock or securities traders, or investment advisors. Thus, one should hesitate before quarreling with the notion that bankruptcy status should play some role in deciding whether to hire a person for those or similar jobs. The same cannot be said for an unspecified job at a title company, a job as a project manager, an unspecified job with an insurance company, a job as an executive assistant, a job as a paralegal for a government contractor, and a job as a customer service representative at a bank. what tellers do, the essence of their job involves fairly simple transactions, namely, accepting customers' deposits, handling their withdrawals, cashing their checks, and the like. Further, tellers do this all under the watchful eye of security cameras, security personnel, and perhaps most importantly, the customers themselves. Thus, it is highly unlikely that a bank teller who has filed bankruptcy poses any more of a threat to steal a customer's money than a bank teller who has an impeccable credit history. Concepci6n, supra note 8, at 539, (Vol. 91 662 Bankruptcy debtors are not very sympathetic figures because of the persistent stereotype that they are financial deadbeats who are undeserving of a break. 3 ' There are certainly financial deadbeats among the cohort of bankruptcy filers, but the idea that the dockets of the bankruptcy courts are swelled with them is a myth.
3 2 One of the purposes of this Article is to counter the argument that bankruptcy debtors are fiscal scofflaws who should find it more difficult to obtain employment because their bankruptcy status makes them less worthy candidates for employment. The typical bankruptcy filer is not helped by being scorned or ridiculed by those fortunate enough to have steered clear of financial difficulty. A second purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that employers should stop refusing to hire a person because he or she is or was a debtor if personal creditworthiness is not related to successful performance of the job the person seeks, and the person is otherwise qualified for the job.
This Article is divided into four parts. On November 6, 1967, two days before the state trial court entered a judgment against them, the Perezes filed bankruptcy, and they included in their list of debts the judgment they confessed to on October 31, 1967. On July 8, 1968, the Perezes received a discharge that included the $2,425.98 judgment in favor of the Pinkertons. 9 At the time, Arizona and forty-four other states had in effect some version of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which was promulgated by the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety.4 0 Arizona called its version the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act ("Arizona Act"). 4 ' Under Article 4 of the Arizona Act, if a judgment for damages "arising out of the ownership, maintenance [,] or use of a motor vehicle" remained unsatisfied for sixty days after its entry, the state court clerk or the state court judge had to forward a certified copy of the judgment to the Superintendent of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Highway Department ("Superintendent").42 Once the Superintendent received a certified copy of a judgment, he or she had to suspend the driver's license and vehicle registration of the judgment debtor, and the suspension remained in effect until the judgment debtor satisfied the judgment and gave proof of financial responsibility for a future period.4* The Arizona Act also provided that "a discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of [Article 4]."44 On March 13, 1968, 126 days after the state trial court entered the judgment against the Perezes and 117 days before they received a discharge, the Superintendent notified the Perezes that their drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations were suspended.45 The Perezes then filed a complaint in federal district court claiming, among other things, that the part of the Arizona Act that conditioned the renewal or issuance of a driver's license and vehicle registration on the satisfaction of a debt that had been discharged in bankruptcy conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act and violated the Supremacy 3 81d. at 638-39. 9 1d. at 639. [a] comprehensive enactment designed to secure compensation for automobile accident victims in a section providing that a discharge in bankruptcy of the automobile accident or tort judgment shall have no effect on the judgment debtor's obligation to repay the judgment creditor, at least insofar as such repayment may be enforced by the withholding of driving privileges by the State. The Court began its analysis by finding that the Supreme Court of Arizona had construed the Arizona Act to be primarily concerned with protecting persons who use the highways from the financial hardship that might result from financially irresponsible persons operating motor vehicles on those highways. 52 Next, the Court repeated what it had stated several times before, namely that "one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to give debtors a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." 53 This "new opportunity" included the freedom from most preexisting tort judgments. 54 The Court then asked "whether a state statute that protects judgment creditors from financially irresponsible persons conflicts with a federal statute that gives discharged debtors a new start unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt On April 4, 1800, the Sixth Congress enacted the nation's first federal bankruptcy law.60 The debate surrounding the law was polarized, with commercial interests supporting it and southern and agricultural interests opposing it.61 Ultimately, the law passed by one vote in the House of Representatives. 62 The 1800 law was a compromise measure, and Congress intended for it to expire in 1805, however, the Eighth Congress repealed it on December 19, 1803.63 On August 19, 1841, the Twenty-Seventh Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.64 The 1841 law differed substantially from the 1800 law in that it allowed a debtor to file bankruptcy and seek a discharge of his debts, which was a first in the history of federal bankruptcy law. 6 A governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
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Congress enacted § 525 in order to provide additional protection to debtors by codifying the holding in Perez "that a State would frustrate the Congressional policy of a fresh start for a debtor if it were permitted to refuse to renew a driver[']s license because a tort judgment resulting from an automobile accident had been unpaid as a result of a discharge in bankruptcy." 8 0 Section 525 prohibits governmental units from denying employment to, terminating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment against a person who is or has been a debtor, or who is or has been associated with a debtor. 8 ' Section 525's anti-discrimination principle applies only to acts of discrimination that are based solely on the basis of bankruptcy, or on the basis of insolvency before or during bankruptcy prior to a determination of discharge, or on the basis of the non-payment of a debt that has been discharged in bankruptcy. 82 It does not ban discrimination based on nonbankruptcy considerations such as future financial responsibility or ability, so long as those considerations are applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. 91 Bankruptcy judges were appointed by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. that was part of "Phase III of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project," which collected data from debtor questionnaires, public court records, and telephone interviews. The authors concluded that Chapter 7 bankruptcy does not "ensure lasting financial well-being" for one-third of families that seek its protection because post-bankruptcy, these families experience a decline in their income often because of job or medical problems. They also stated that notwithstanding the prohibition on terminating a person for filing bankruptcy, it happens nevertheless); Lea Shepard, Seeking from denying employment to, terminating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment against a person who is or has been a debtor, or who is or has been associated with a debtor,"' while § 525(b) prohibits private employers from terminating the employment of, or discriminating with respect to employment against a person who is or has been a debtor, or who is or has been associated with a debtor.11 2 The prohibitions in both sections are the same, except § 525(b) does not include the phrase "deny employment to." The Supreme Court has said on multiple occasions, " [w] hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute, but omits it in another section of the same statute, it is generally presumed that Congress intentionally omitted the language in the other section. The Supreme Court has also said on multiple occasions that " [w] hen identical words and phrases appear in the same statute, those words and phrases should be given the same meaning," 6 and a statute should be interpreted to give effect to all of its provisions so that no part of it is rendered superfluous."
7 The phrase "discriminate with respect to employment" ap- A disparate treatment plaintiff bears the burden of proving the defendant intentionally discriminated against him or her on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
9
In its first iteration, Title VII did not include an express prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact, but in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court interpreted the law to prohibit facially neutral practices that operate in a discriminatory fashion.140 Griggs held that if an employment practice operates to exclude persons based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the practice is not related to successful On November 21, 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which among other things, codified Griggs.14 3 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff has to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that an employer uses "a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."1 44 If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer can defend itself by demonstrating that the practice is "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."s 4 5 Even if, however, the employer proves job relatedness and business necessity, a plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that the employer refused to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has a less disparate impact and that serves its legitimate needs.146
Because blacks and Latinos are overrepresented among bankruptcy filers, they are probably disproportionately impacted by employers' refusal to hire debtors.14 7 Many, but certainly not all, commentators agree with this premise.148 There are no published-or unpublished for that matter-judicial A credit check will disclose a bankruptcy. A 2000 study by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation found that 27% of whites had a poor credit rating, while 48% of blacks and 34% of Latinos had a poor credit rating. Since 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued a number of decisions finding that the use of credit scores as an employment screening device has a disparate impact on racial minorities); Earle, Madek & Missirian, supra note 8, at 161-72; Karpa, supra note 8, at 86-90 (Because of lending discrimination known as "redlining," "blacks and Latinos have higher unemployment rates and less favorable credit scores," and as a consequence, they are more adversely impacted by the use of credit checks as an employment screening device"); Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 8, at *1-6 (There is a strong correlation between race and credit scores. Blacks have poor credit at a rate that is 21% higher than whites, and blacks file bankruptcy at disproportionate rates); Landry & Hardy, supra note 10, at 54-60 the issue of private employers' refusal to hire debtors causing a disparate impact based on race. First, a person cannot successfully argue that an employment practice causes a disparate impact based on his or her case alone because disparate impact requires proof that the challenged employment practice discriminates against a group based on race, color, religion, sex, or national original, not just on an individual.15 6 That means a single plaintiff cannot succeed unless he or she can amass statistics that demonstrate that not only was he or she excluded, but others similarly situated were excluded because of the same employment practice. 57 Although employers that are covered by Title VIIiS are required to maintain records that disclose the impact their selection procedures have on the employment opportunities of persons by race, sex, or ethnic group,1 5 9 it is expensive to obtain this information and have it analyzed by a person with the requisite expertise to pass judicial muster. There are not a lot of plaintiffs with the financial wherewithal to fund disparate impact litigation, and there are not a lot of lawyers who can afford to fund these cases themselves on the chance that they will result in a large enough recovery that the lawyer can recoup the costs he or she advanced. A second possible reason why there is no reported litigation on the issue of private employers' refusal to hire debtors causing a disparate impact based on race is judicial solicitude towards employers in discrimination cases.
Since Circuit often says in employment discrimination cases that "courts do not sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers." 1 62
From the publicly available data, no court has been presented with the question of whether employers' refusal to hire debtors causes a disparate impact based on race. On the related issue of the use of credit history checks more broadly, the EEOC botched Freeman and Parker. Thus, one will have to wait for another day to see how a court will rule in a case that squarely presents the question of whether bankruptcy discrimination causes a disparate impact based on race, national origin, or both.
IV. MOST AMERICANS EXIST IN A STATE OF FINANCIAL
PERIL AND OVERSPENDING HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH IT.
There is a view that debtors are irresponsible, dishonest, have poor judgment, poor management skills, or both, or that they are more susceptible to illicit temptation because of financial pressure, therefore, "bankruptcy status [is] a valuable screening tool in some hiring contexts.". 63 One cannot help but wonder whether this view is partially predicated on the notion that opportunities for advancement should be reserved for those who have been vir- Contrary to what Judge Gilman maintains, our Circuit has never adopted a "business-judgment rule" which requires us to defer to the employer's "reasonable business judgment" in Title VII cases. Indeed, in most Title VII cases the very issue in dispute is whether the employer's adverse employment decision resulted from an objectively unreasonable business judgment, i.e., a judgment that was based upon an impermissible consideration such as the adversely-affected employee's race, gender, religion, or national origin. In determining whether the plaintiff has produced enough evidence to cast doubt upon the employer's explanation for its decision, we cannot, as Judge Gilman does, unquestionably accept the employer's own self-serving claim that the decision resulted from an exercise of "reasonable business judgment." Nor can we decide "as a matter of law" that "an employer's proffered justification is reasonable." The question of whether the employer's judgment was reasonable or was instead motivated by improper considerations is for the jury to consider. Our role is merely to assess whether the plaintiff has presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to accept the plaintiffs claim that the employer made an unlawful business decision. tuous, and one sign of virtue is a pristine financial record. According to this view, those who have spotty financial records have not been sufficiently virtuous, therefore, they should not be heard to complain about being denied employment opportunities because those are the just deserts for persons who are undeserving in the first place. Professor Michael Sandel described this attitude as "the smug assumption that .. . success is the crown of virtue," and that those who are on the top of the social, educational, political, or economic hierarchy are on top because they are more deserving than those below.164 Commenting on this kind of thinking in the context of admission to highly selective colleges and universities, Professor Randall Kennedy has written,
[m]any of the traits we most admire -intelligence, knowledge, creativity, insight -are not solely, often not even mainly, the fruit of our own effort [,] but are instead offshoots of circumstances beyond one's control: inborn genius, health, caring parents, attentive teachers, a decent neighborhood. That is why discussions of university admissions and similar mechanisms of allocation need to be scrubbed clean of the excessively self-congratulatory individualism in which they tend to be steeped.165
Putting philosophical quarrels aside for a moment, there is some empirical data that undermines the premise that an adverse inference about a person's character or fitness as an employee is merited simply because the person is or has been a debtor. "'sKennedy, supra note 163, at 113.
"Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059-60 (discussing a 2011 settlement between the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Countrywide Financial Corporation over the bank's racially discriminatory lending practices; a 2012 settlement between the DOJ and Sun Trust Mortgage over the lender's racially discriminatory lending practices; a 2012 settlement between the DOJ and Wells Fargo over the banks' racially discriminatory lending practices; and a 2013 settlement between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the DOJ, and PNC Bank over the bank's racially discriminatory lending practices); Warren, supra note 15, at 1780-81 (discussing the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, which showed racial disparities in bankruptcy filings and that "90% of bankruptcy filers either attended college, had a job in the upper 80% of all occupations in the United States, or owned a home, 67% met two of these criteria, and nearly 30% met all three.") 16 Warren, supra note 15, at 1777-99.
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(Vol. 91 REFUSING TO HIRE ruptcy, they expected to find debtors who were marginally employed if at all, poorly educated, and facing a bleak financial future.1 68 Their predictions about their subjects' financial situation was not far off the mark, as their 1981 study showed that "approximately 25% of the families filing for bankruptcy had incomes below the poverty line, and 50% had incomes between the poverty line and the national median income."' 6 9 By the time of the publication of the CBP in 2001, however, things had changed dramatically.1 7 0 The GBP showed that '90% of debtors either attended college, had a job in the upper 80% of all occupations in the United States, or owned a home; 67% fit into two of these categories; and nearly 30% fit into all three."171 This led Professor1 72 Warren to describe the bankruptcy courts as Warren further noted that the CBP showed that "68.3% of all bankruptcy filings resulted from job layoffs, job cutbacks, salary cuts, or business failings."174 "Medical problems and medical debts accounted for 51% of filings, and divorce or the death of a spouse accounted for 20% of filings."' 7 s All told, "job difficulties, medical issues, and divorce played a role in 90% of bankruptcy filings according to the CBP."17 6 The CBP also revealed that there is a racial dimension to who files bankruptcy.1 77 "Black families filed at the rate of 29.6 filings per 1,000 households; Latino families filed at the rate of 17.1 filings per 1,000 households; and white families filed at the rate of 9.3 filings per 1,000 households, meaning black families are more than three times as likely to file bankruptcy as white families, and Latino families are almost 6'sId. at 1780. 
2017)
twice as likely to file bankruptcy as white families."' 7 s Professor Warren's Economics of Race article demonstrates that most of those who seek bankruptcy protection are middle class, regardless of race, but middle class blacks and Latinos exist under far more financial risk than do middle class whites.' 79 For example, Warren contends that home ownership is widely considered a hallmark of middle class financial stability. 8 0 Analyzing data from 2001, she found that "67.7% of Americans owned their homes, and those homes had an average value of $122,000."181 That data, however, showed marked racial disparities in home ownership rates and home values.1 82 It showed that "whites owned homes at a rate of 74.3%; blacks owned homes at a rate of 47.7%; and Latinos owned homes at a rate of 47.3%."183 It also revealed that "white homeowners' homes had a median value of $130,000, while the median value of the homes owned by non-white persons was $92,000."184 Owning a home is typically associated with middle class financial stability, but being a homeowner does not immunize one from the kind of fiscal distress that can lead to a bankruptcy filing, and here too, the CBP showed racial disparities among homeowners who filed bankruptcy.1 8 5 The data demonstrated that "black homeowners file bankruptcy at the rate of 31.7 per 1,000 homeowners; Latinos file at the rate of 16.4 per 1,000 homeowners; and whites file at the rate of 6.1 per 1,000 homeowners."1 86 Stated another way, "black homeowners file at a rate that is more than five times higher than the rate at which white homeowners file, and Latino homeowners file at a rate that is more than three times higher than the rate at which white homeowners file."' 8 7 One reason why black and Latino homeowners exist in a more perilous financial state than their white counterparts is racially discriminatory lending practices in credit and housing transactions.' 8 8
On April 11, 1968, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), which makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing be- Professor Atkinson then turned to a case the DOJ filed on July 12, 2012 against Wells Fargo, which at that point was the DOJ's second largest fair lending lawsuit ever. 2 00 The DOJ alleged that "Wells Fargo steered black and Latino homebuyers into expensive mortgages and charged them excessive fees." 20 1 Wells Fargo paid $175 million to settle the case. 202 Finally, Professor Atkinson discussed a January 9, 2014 settlement between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau of the United States ("CFPB") and National City Bank, which was a lending discrimination lawsuit where the CFPB alleged that "National City Bank had policies and practices in place that resulted in black and Latino borrowers paying higher interest rates, fees, and other costs than similarly situated white borrowers, and that those higher rates, fees, and costs could not be fully explained by factors other than race and national origin. prime mortgage mania that preceded the 2008 recession, "black women were 5.7% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than black men and 256% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than white men." 2 0 6 "Latino women were 12.7% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than Latino men and 177% more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than white men." 2 07
Professor Atkinson analyzed a 2014 study that showed that of the top 100 cities that were home to the highest number of homeowners whose homes were worth less than the debt that encumbered those homes, 71 of those cities had a population that exceeded 40% black and Latino.
2 08
Atkinson also analyzed a study of home foreclosures between 2007 and 2009, which demonstrated that "black and Latino homeowners were 70% more likely to lose their homes to foreclosure than white homeowners, and higher income blacks were more than 80% more likely to lose their homes to foreclosure than similarly situated whites." 20 9 Housing is not the only area in which Professor Atkinson found that blacks and Latinos face economic headwinds. 2 10 She analyzed a 1995 study showing that automobile sellers "routinely charged blacks and women higher prices for cars than white male purchasers." 2 11 She found a later study that examined "more than 300,000 car loans across 33 states, and it showed that blacks paid more for cars than white purchasers regardless of creditworthi- Ally Bank, however, was not the sole lender engaging in racially discriminatory auto lending. 2 1 7 On July 14, 2015, the DOJ sued American Honda Finance Corporation ("AHFC") alleging that "AHFC discriminated by charging thousands of black, Latino, and Asian-Pacific Islander borrowers higher interest rates than white borrowers." 2 18 The DOJ and the CFPB claimed that "AHFC charged borrowers higher interest rates because of their race or national origin, and not because of their creditworthiness or other objective criteria related to borrower risk." 2 19 The DOJ's complaint also alleged that the "average black borrower paid over $250 more during the term of his or her loan because of discrimination, the average Latino borrower paid over $200 more during the term of his or her loan because of discrimination, and the average Asian-Pacific Islander borrower paid over $150 more during the term of his or her loan because of discrimination." 2 20 AHFC paid $24 million to settle the case. Despite the existence of the FHA and the ECOA, blacks and Latinos face many daunting and irrational obstacles in conducting ordinary consumer transactions such as purchasing homes and cars.
2 2 2 But discriminatory and predatory lending practices are not the only challenges blacks and Latinos face in their attempt to obtain and maintain economic security. Professor Atkinson analyzed census data, and it showed that in 2010, "black households had a median income of $32,068, Latino households had a median income of $37,579, and white households had a median income of $54,620."223 She cited a 2011 article demonstrating that "the median income for black Americans has remained at approximately 60% of the median income for white Americans for the past four decades. 221Id. 222 Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1059-60; Warren, supra note 15, at 1792-98. 223 Atkinson, supra note 15, at 1062. Atkinson also evidenced that in addition to there being a racial income gap in the United States, there is a racial wealth gap.
2 2 7 Wealth is a more accurate way to gauge financial security than income because "wealth is seen first as a personal safety net, or an unspecified amount of money that is stored away to cushion against the unexpected health crisis, job termination, legal difficulty, or repair of the family car. Simply put, blacks and Latinos have a demonstrably more difficult time obtaining and maintaining wealth than their similarly situated white counterparts, and this contributes to blacks being more than three times more likely than similarly situated whites to file bankruptcy and Latinos being almost twice as likely as similarly situated whites to file bankruptcy. You wouldn't know any of that to look at me. I like to think I appear reasonably prosperous. Nor would you know it to look at my r6sum6. I have had a passably good career as a writer-five books, hundreds of articles published, a number of awards and fellowships, and a small (very small) but respectable reputation. You wouldn't even know it to look at my tax return. I am nowhere near rich, but I have typically made a solid middle-or even, at times, upper-middleclass income, which is about all a writer can expect, even a writer who also teaches and lectures and writes television scripts, as I do.
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He pointed out that financial advisers recommend that people save at least 10% to 15% of their income for retirement and emergencies, but he goes on to say that the reason many people cannot save for a "rainy day is that we live in an ongoing storm. Every day, it seems there is some, new, unanticipated expense -a stove that won't light, a car that won't start, a dog that limps, a faucet that leaks. Four hundred dollar emergencies are not mere hypotheticals, nor are $2,000 emergencies. . . The fact is that emergencies always arise; they are an intrinsic part of our existences. . . Life happens, yes, but shit happens too. . .".246
Mr. Gabler also discussed how income stagnation contributes to most Americans' perilous financial states. 247 He says that inflation adjusted wages "peaked in 1972, and since then, the average hourly wage has remained essentially flat." 2 4 8 He also says that "household incomes rose dramatically in the forty-seven years between 1967 and 2014 for the top quintile of income earners, and even more dramatically for the top 5%."249 During that same period, however, "incomes in the middle quintile rose 23.2%; incomes in the second lowest quintile rose 13.1%; and incomes in the bottom quintile rose 17.8%."250 Income for the "bottom three quartiles peaked in 1999 and 2000, but since then, incomes in the middle quintile have declined by 6.9%; incomes 24 5 Gabler, supra note 244, at 3. 
2017)
in the second lowest quintile have declined by 10.8%, and incomes in the lowest quintile have declined by 17.1%."251
A report from May 2016 shows that the combined balances of a majority of Americans' checking and savings accounts is under $1,000, which means most people in this country are a health incident or a car problem away from serious financial distress, 2 52 and it is not true that the reason for this is because they spend too much money on frivolities. Morality.255 In The Over-Consumption Myth, Warren explains that "adjusted for inflation, a family of four today spends 21% less on clothing than it did in the early 1970s," which debunks the idea that people are in debt because they wasted their money on haute couture.
2 56 She points out that "that same family of four does spend more eating at restaurants than it used to, but it spends a lot less at the grocery store because of bulk purchases and the availability of generic goods." 2 5
7 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that families have the fiscal problems they do because they spend too much money at highpriced restaurants because even with the restaurant budget being what it is, "a four person family today spends 22% less on food than that same family did a generation ago." 2 58
Some attribute families' financial woes to overspending on luxury home goods like "dishwashers, washing machines, dryers, cable or satellite television, big screen televisions, and other consumer electronics." 259 Professor
Warren rebuts this by observing that "these items were considered luxuries in 1970, but today, one can find one or more of them in over one-half of the homes in America." 260 Today, people of modest means who own consumer goods that were once the playthings of the rich are not auditioning for "Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous." 2 6 1 Instead, they have these goods because they are more widely available and more affordable because the "costs of 
2"
3 Wrren, supra note 17, at 1492-1506.
254d.
"Warren, supra note 17, at 1485-1511. Id. at 1492-93. 257Id. at 1493-94. It is indeed true that many people behave irresponsibly when it comes to spending.
27 4 But it is a myth that the typical person who finds himself on the verge of financial collapse owes his plight solely or mostly to overconsumption.
2 75 Professor Warren's work shows that "most American families spend less than they used to on ordinary consumption like consumer goods and more on the basics of being middle class like housing, healthcare, and transportation."
276 It is no easy task to stay afloat financially. A person can be as morally upright as possible and still find himself in a financial tailspin as a result of the ordinary vicissitudes of everyday life. Such is the case for the overwhelming majority of persons who file bankruptcy. The bankruptcy system promises them a fresh start, and that promise is broken when a debtor is qualified for a job, the job can be performed successfully regardless of bankruptcy status, and an employer denies the person a job simply because of his or her bankruptcy status.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to heap calumny on debtors; after all, every debtor is a person who ultimately could not pay his or her bills, which means someone whom the debtor owed will not get paid anything or will get paid very little. Also, hiring a person to do any job entails some risk, and employers are right to be risk averse. Employers should not be irrational, however. One of the myths that persist about debtors is they are fiscal scofflaws who need to be shown tough love, and if that means they have a harder time getting hired, then so be it. The typical bankruptcy filer is not helped by being scorned or ridiculed by those fortunate enough to have steered clear of financial difficulty.
Employers should not deny employment to a person who is or has been a debtor if personal creditworthiness is not related to successful performance of the job the person seeks and the person is otherwise qualified. Some employers use bankruptcy status as a blunt instrument; if a person is or was a debtor, then he or she does not get the job, period, end of discussion. If an www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/all/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-andconsumer-protection-actbapcpa/2012/12/31 (last visited July 25, 2017). Warren, supra note 17, at 1485-1495. employer is alarmed by what a bankruptcy might mean about an applicant's personal characteristics, it is not too much to ask for that employer to investigate a bit further to determine if the applicant actually lacks those characteristics. Relying on bankruptcy status simpliciter is antithetical to a core purpose of the bankruptcy system, which is to give debtors a fresh start. Employers' prerogatives to operate according to whatever employment policies and practices they wish should be balanced against employees' and potential employees' right to participate in the labor market in an environment free of irrational discrimination. It is irrational to deny employment to a person who is or was a debtor if the person is otherwise qualified, and the job can be successfully performed regardless of bankruptcy status. To allow such discrimination makes the bankruptcy system's promise of a fresh start illusory.
